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"In my opinion the conscientiuons scruples of all men should be treated
with great delicacy and tenderness ... and it is my desire, that the laws
may always be as extensivevely accommodated to them, as due regard
for protection and essential interest of the nation may justify and permit. "
Geroge Washington

1.

Introduction
In order to maintain an appropriate barrier between church and
state and insure the propagation of religious freedom, the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution specifically limits the federal
government's authority to legislate in regards to religion. A~ such it
is commonly understood and accepted that Congress may not
make laws that have the specific intent of either supporting or hindering religious groups. However, if a law of general applicability
(one which does not single out religion as a category for intentional
treatment or mistreatment) does have the effect of incidentally burdening religious practice, its legitimacy is less certain. Most argue
that if these laws do in fact hinder the practice of religion and thus
violate a basic constitutional right, then they should at least be heavily scrutinized, if not automatically ruled as unconstitutional.
Recendy, however, that understanding has failed to capture a
majority in the honorable opinions of the Supreme Court.
In June 1998, both houses of Congress proposed legislation
intending to afford a greater protection of religious liberties.
Supported by a diverse coalition of more than sixty religious and
civil liberties groups, the Religious Liberty Protection Act (RLPA)
seeks to remedy the burdens of these generally applicable laws
upon religious practices left otherwise exposed by the Supreme
Court's decision in City of Boerne v. Aores (City of Boerne v.
Aores 1997,2157). This is not a new ballie for Congress. In wake
of the Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith
(Employment Division v. Smith 1990, 872), Congress similarly
responded with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)
in 1993. Passing with overwhelming support, Court observers
thought that this put an end to the issue. However, the Aores decision effectively nullified RFRA as unconstitutional, thus prompting supporters to regroup and try again with RLPA.
This debate over federal law with regards to religious liberty has indeed been a heated process in the last
decade. It has prompted serious discourse in at least two fields
of study. First, it has raised legal questions dealing with Free
Exercise Clause jurisprudence, basic structural questions of
separation of powers, federalism and the status of fundamental rights. Second, it has provided political scientists with
copious material in analyzing the relationships between the
various branches of government. From the latter perspective,
interplay, particularly of Congress and the Court, is a model
of policy decision making in which the various branches
engage in "an ongoing and, ultimately, productive dialogue
about the meaning of First Amendment religious liberty protections" (Devins 1998, 647). The working out of this dialogue demonstrates an interactive process and "reaffirms the
original constitutional understanding that the court and the
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President and the Congress (not Congress alone) would
determine statutory policy" (Eskridge 1991,617).1
In this essay I will discuss the proposed Religious
Liberty Protection Act, considering both its legal concerns
and its political considerations. I proceed in Part II by outlining a historical look at religion and the Constitution in this
past century as it relates to the current controversy. From this
perspective it is easy to discern how the Court's historic
Smith decision departed drastically from the correct and
established precedent of protecting religious liberty, and how
rather than simply passing as a momentary whim of bad
jurisprudence, the court strengthened its stand in Flores seven
years later. I further explain how RLPA seeks to fulfill the
mission of RFRA by making up for the latter's constitutional shortcomings. In Part III I look at the political game
through a positive political theory model developed by
William Eskridge, Jr. (1991). Viewed as an interactive and
dynamic game, Congress may rightfully be seen as having
challenged the Court when it proposed RFRA, and I discuss
whether the Flores decision was a predictable or appropriate
response to such a "turf" challenge. Part IV concludes that
RLPA is facially constitutional, and that if it can muster the
same overwhelming support as RFRA, it should be held as
such. To the extent that the Supreme Court recognizes and
shows deference toward Congress's power under the
Spending and Commerce Clauses, RLPA should withstand its
scrutiny.

::?

A Legal Understanding

A. From Lochner to Smith
Any time the Supreme Court reviews a law to
determine its constitutionality, it can employ one of two basic
tests. The majority of cases are subject to a simple rational
basis test which only requires the government to demonstrate
that the law in question is "rationally related to a legitimate
government purpose" (qtd. in Stone et al. 1996,573). Other
times the court has seen fit to subject laws to a more heightened scrutiny. This test requires government to assume the
burden of proving that a given law is "narrowly tailored" to
serve a" compelling" state interest. This more stringent review
has been applied (and arguably misapplied) in various types of
cases throughout constitutional history. For example, during
the early part of this century, a very laissez-faire minded
Court liberally applied strict scrutiny to any case of economic concern, effectively usurping legislative power by over-

turning many state and federal statutory laws. This trend,
beginning as it did with the case of Lochner v. New York
(Lochner v. New York 1905, 45), became known as the
Lochner era. Under pressure from legal scholars and the other
branches of government, the Court began to limit its use of
this test and "rather firmly established that it will afford
heightened or strict scrutiny where the law under review
either contains a suspect classification or impacts a fundamental right" (Lee 1993, 80) .
This is probably as it should be. As discussed below
in Part III, a respect for democracy should prompt the courts
to adopt an attitude of deference toward the legislatures in
general, while still protecting the fundamental rights of
minorities who do not as easily gain access to the political
process. The obvious difficulty, then, is determining which
rights are "fundamental" and thus subject to strict scrutiny.
Mter all, the Constitution neither explicitly nor implicitly
denotes a hierarchy of rights. Historically, fundamental rights

have been defmed as those which fall under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause as determined by the
courts. Yet, whatever the list may include, we can assume that
religious liberty is numbered among them, at least since
Cantwell v. Connecticut (Cantwell v. Connecticut 1940,296).
In this case the Court determined that "the fundamental concept of liberty embodied in [the Fourteenth) Amendment
embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment"
(Cantwell v. Connecticut 1940,303). This, of course, includes
the Free Exercise Clause. Accordingly, this principle of applying strict scrutiny to laws which infringe upon the free exercise of religion (even if only incidentally) became established
at least by the time of Sherbert v. Verner (Sherbert v. Verner
1963, 398), and further strengthened by Wisconsin v. Yoder
(Wisconsin v. Yoder 1972, 205). In both of these cases, a generally applicable law had the effect of hindering the free exercise of religion. In both cases, the court recognized the need
to protect this fundamental right and judged the respective

statutes according to the strictest scrutiny. Writing for the
Court, Chief Justice Burger reemphasized the basic principle:
"[Only] those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance the legitimate claims of free
exercise of religion" (qtd. in Stone et al. 1996, 1593, emphasis
added). It seemed that the standard was set.
Then in 1990, the Court made an unprecedented
move in the case of Employment Division v. Srrrith (Employment
Division v. Smith 1990, 872). When members of the Native
American Church were denied unemployment benefits after
being fired from their jobs for ingesting peyote, they ftled suit
claiming that the existing controlled substances laws effectively
burdened the free exercise of their religion. Court observers waited to see whether the statute would be upheld or if it would fail
to survive strict scrutiny. As it turned out, the statute was upheld
without surviving this rigorous test; it did not have to because the
test was not invoked. In his majority opinion, Justice Scalia abandoned the compelling interest test for generally applicable laws
that do not single out religions and only incidentally inhibit religion. (Employment Division v. Smith 1990,878).
Though he is not wholly without precedent, this
decision flips the prevailing standard on its head. Attempting
to show consistency, Scalia first tries to dismiss the idea that
generally applicable laws which only incidentally burden religion are subject to strict scrutiny. He claims that only laws
specifically aimed at prohibiting religion merit this test.
Indeed he accuses respondents of"carry[ing] the meaning of
'prohibiting the free exercise [of religion], one large step further" (qtd. in Stone et aI. 1996, 1599).
This notion is silly for two reasons. First, historically
the Supreme Court has been asked to review few laws that
specifically target religion; it simply has not been a considerable
problem. The most common and controversial cases dealing with
the Free Exercise Clause are those which are generally applicable. As Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion points out:
Generally applicable laws are [not] "one large step" removed
from laws aimed at specific religious practices. The First
Amendment ... does not distinguish between laws that are
generally applicable and laws that target particular religious
practices ... Our free exercise cases have all concerned generally applicable laws that had the effect of significantly burdening a religious practice (qtd. in Stone et al. 1996, 1603,
emphasis added). Second, to declare that religious liberty is
not burdened if the effect is only incidental is preposterous.
Indeed, Yoder clarifies that there are areas of conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and
thus beyond the power of the State to control, even under
regulations of general applicability ...
A regulation neutral on its face may, in its application,
nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion (qtd. in Lee 1993, 87).Scalia further attempts to show consistency by dismissing this clear precedent ofYoder, claiming that
the Court only applies strict scrutiny in hybrid cases. That is, he
claims that burdens to free exercise from neutral, generally
applicable laws can only receive heightened First Amendment
protection when coupled with other "constitutional protections
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such as freedom of speech and of the press ... " (Stone et al. 1996,
1600). This seem, to imply that the fundamental right of religious freedom is only secondary to other rights and alone is
insufficient to invite the most considerable protection and the
strictest scrutiny. This claim, too, seems unconvincing. As stated
by Rex Lee, The first freedom of the First Amendment is the
free exercise of religion, and nothing in the text, history or previous judicial interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause suggests that this freedom must depend upon some other constitutional guarantee for protection (1993, 88) .Furthermore,
while he cites Yoder in defense of this proposition, Scalia fails
to recognize that the Court's opinion in that case affirmed "that
the Free Exercise Clause (by itself) often requires exemptions
to generally applicable law" (Lee 1993,88).
From this point, Scalia's argument only worsens. He
does admit that respondents are not demanding an unqualified nullification of every law that hinders any minority religion anywhere, but are simply asking for the most heightened
scrutiny to be invoked in such cases.Yet, he denies this request
in a long chain of unconvincing arguments. First, he says that
it only applies to unemployment compensation cases (which
is a questionable response since Smith is such a case) and that
even if extended beyond such, it could never apply to criminal cases. Second, he claims that the only reason they apply
the test in such cases is under "the proposition that where the
State has in place a system of individual exemptions, it may
not refuse to extend that system to cases of'religious hardship'
without compelling reason" (qtd. in Stone et al. 1996, 1601,
emphasis added). Again, it leaves one wondering why religious freedom is not a good enough reason to independently merit its own "individual exemption."Third, he defends the
compelling interest test in cases of racial inequality and free
speech cases, but contends that the effects of applying this
stringent test to Free Exercise cases would produce "a constitutional anomaly" (qtd. in Stone et al. 1996, 1601).As if this
is not sufficiently blatant, he concludes that protecting the
Free Exercise portion of the First Amendment by the most
stringent means available is a "luxury," and that "[a]ny society
adopting such a system would be courting anarchy" (qtd. in
Stone et al. 1996, 1602).
Unfortunately, the Court's opinion adopts the attitude
and has the effect of relegating religious freedom and toleration
to second-class status which Scalia dismisses as an "unavoidable
consequence of democratic government" (qtd. in Stone et al.
1996,1603). In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor criticizes the Court on each of the above assertions. Ultimately she
challenges her colleagues to fulfill their obligation of protecting
minority rights, subjecting all challenged laws under Free Exercise
claims to strict scrutiny in "a case-by-case determination of the
question, sensitive to the facts of each particular claim" (qtd. in
Stone et al. 1996, 1604). After all, as the language of the Clause
itself makes clear, an individual's free exercise of religion is a preferred constitutional activity... The compelling interest test
reflects the First Amendments mandate of preserving religious
liberty to the fullest extent possible in a pluralistic society. For the
Court to deem this command a luxury [is] to denigrate '[t]he very
purpose of a Bill of Rights' (qtd. in Stone et al. 19961605).

B. RFRA-A legislative response
Recognizing the necessity of protecting religious
liberty as a fundamental right (at least on par with free speech
and racial equality) immediately reached beyond the Court's
minority to Congress. In the following years, lawmakers from
both houses of Congress proposed several versions of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). In 1993, with
overwhelming support in both houses and great commendation by President Clinton, RFRA became law. It responded
to Smith by legislatively mandating that "[g]overnment shall
not burden a persons' exercise of religion, even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability" unless such a law
can survive the most heightened scrutiny (U.S. Congress
1993, sec. 3(a)-(b)). Simply stated, RFRA sought to restore
the most stringent protection of what historically recognized
as a fundamental right. The important concern with surviving as constitutional, however, resided in effectively establishing a "head of power" from whence Congress could claim
legitimate authority for enacting RFRA
According to the bill itself, Congress derives constitutional authority from Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Granting Congress the power "to enforce by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article" (qtd. in
Lee 1993, 90), and recognizing that First Amendment rights
are adopted as part of the "fundamental liberties" of the
Fourteenth Amendment (Cantwell v. Connecticut 1940,303),
RFRA is asserted as such "appropriate legislation." This is
legitimized by at least three Supreme Court decisions. First in
Ex Parte Virginia, the court held that What-ever legislation is
appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the
amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions they contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and the
equal protection of the laws against State denial or invasion, if
not prohibited is brought within the domain of Congressional
power (Ex Parte Virginia 1880,345-346, emphasis added).
Second, in Katzenbach v. Morgan the Court reaffirmed that
Section Five is "a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining
whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment" (Katzen bach v.
Morgan 1966,651). The Court has dubbed this power "remedial" in that it can enforce Fourteenth Amendment protections and guarantees, though it cannot declare its constitutional substance. Finally, both of these previous cases were
reaffirmed in the more recent case of City of Richmond v.
J.A.Croson, Co. (City of Richmond v.J.A.Croson, Co 1989,
469). In her majority opinion,Justice O'Connor even quotes
Ex Parte Virginia in stating that both the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendment "were intended to be what they really are, limitations of the powers of the States and enlargements
of the power of Congress." (qtd. in Stone et al. 653). Besides,
the type oflegislation that has historically been most suspect
and thus most adamantly scrutinized by the Court, is that
which limits or narrows minority rights. Why? Because leg-

Simply stated, RPRA sought to restore the
most stringent protection ofwhat historically recognized as a fundamental right.
The important concern with surviving as
constitutional, however, resided in effectivelyestablishinga 'nead ofpower"from
whence Congress could claim legitimate
authorityfor enacting RFRA.
islation often has the effect of hindering some amount ofliberty somewhere, and that hindrance will be felt most acutely
by minority groups which cannot as readily protect their
interests through the political process. It has then traditionally fallen to the courts to protect these rights and liberties.
However, RFRA proposed just the opposite; Congress went
out of its way to protect minority rights. As such, one would
think that the Court would have readily accepted this legislation. Unfortunately, as discussed below it did not. Thus, the
usual paradigm of Congress inhibiting minority rights and
the Court defending these rights has been reversed in this
past decade. We are left to wonder why the Court has taken
this unnecessarily hostile stand against religion. As Rex Lee
observes, "[f]rom the standpoint of constitutional policy, giving those within a suspect class [minority religions] a lesser,
rather than a greater, protection is the ultimate perversion"
(1993,95).
In 1997, the Supreme Court heard the case of City
of Boerne v. Flores (City of Boerne v. Flores 1997,2157). In this
case, Flores, the Catholic Archbishop of San Antonio, was
denied a building permit for enlarging a church because the
church was located within a historic preservation district. Flores
filed suit claming protection under RFRA. In its decision, the
Court concluded that RFRA was unconstitutional because it
exceeded Congress's power to enact it. In the majority opinion,
Justice Kennedy rehashed all the old arguments of Smith and
reaffirmed the Court's stand. He then turned to examine the
central question regarding the legislative authority by which
RFRA was enacted. As anticipated, the argument centered
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C. Flores-The Court fights back
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around the distinction of Congress's Section Five power as
being remedial rather than substantive. Kennedy concedes the
argument made above-that Section Five is indeed "a positive
grant oflegislative power"-but also warns, "that '[a]s broad as
the congressional enforcement power is, it is not unlimited'''(U.S. Supreme Court 1997, 6).At its substance, his argument
follows that Congress's authority is limited to simply enforcing
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment; it cannot defme or
interpret the constitutional substance. If such a violation of

best. H e acknowledges that the respondents already recognize
this distinction and simply claim "that RFRA is a proper exercise of Congress's remedial or preventative power ... [and] is a
reasonable means of protecting the free exercise of religion as
defmed by Smith" (U.S. Supreme Court 1997, 10). Finally, he
turns to considering whether or not this is so.
Providing a series of arguments that are no better
than those found in Smith, the Court does conclude that
RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or

authority is demonstrable, then RFRA must be unconstitutional-first, for compromising principles of federalism and second,
for violating the established structure of separation of powers.
To this extent, Kennedy follows a historical overview
of the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment, and a series of
Supreme Court opinions supporting this remedial/substantive
dichotomy.This is instructional, of course, but probably moot at

preventative object that it cannot be understood as responsive to or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior. It
appears, instead, to attempt a substantive change in constitutional protections (U.S. Supreme Court 1997 ii, emphasis
added).Of course, the questionable reasoning as to how the
majority arrives at this conclusion is not significant for this
essay. At the very least we must accept that RFRA is uncon-

stitutional, if for no other reason than that the Court said so.
The point is that if Congress now hopes to provide a legislative
remedy through the Religious Liberty Protection Act (RLPA), they
will need to find a new constitutional " hook," and be sure to satisfy the demands of federalism and separation of powers concerns as
understood by the Court in Flores.

D. RLPA -Another chance?

On June 23, 1998, Professor Michael W.
McConnell of the University of Utah School of Law
addressed the Senate Judiciary Committee during hearings
on the Religious Liberty Protection Act (RLPA) . In this
address, he clearly and convincingly defended RLPA as an
appropriate and constitutionally sound remedy to the defi-

ciencies of RFRA as outlined in Flores. Specifically, he
responded to the three-part challenge of: (1) identifying an
appropriate constitutional footing or "head of power"which
will, (2) preserve the integrity of the structured separation of
powers and, (3) satisfy the demands of federalism.
As recognized above, the danger of declaring
Congressional authority from the Section Five enforcement
power is that the Court always has the prerogative of declar-

ing any statutory provision as having crossed the line from
remedial enforcement to substantive interpretation . Such was
the downfall RFRA. Congress viewed Smith as having minimized the protection afforded to religious liberty, but its
response was invalidated because the Court saw it as an
assumption of power beyond the authority of simply enforcing constitutional rights. Notice, however, what the Court did
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not say: Flores did not suggest-and no other precedent of
the Court suggests-that there is anything improper about
the Congressional objective of protecting religious freedom
beyond the constitutional minimum, so long as Congress does
so through other constitutionally vested powers (McConnell
1998,2, emphasis added).

A. America's Constitutional Democracy

With RLPA, Congress has chosen as its "other constitutionally vested powers" those found in the Spending and
the Commerce Clauses to offer a fuller protection to religious
liberty "beyond the constitutional minimum." As such, it
avoids the shady issue of violating the separation of powers,
because there is no judicial authority to be usurped; they
merely assert their power in protecting religion as a statutory
right (on par with environmental or disabilities concerns)
rather than as a constitutional right. Avoiding any questionable
constitutional interpretation, Congress simply declared religion as "an important human value that [itl can promote to
the full extent of its constitutional powers" (McConnell 1998,
2). This seems especially safe since, in the last half of the century, the Court's established precedent has been to uphold
Congress's Spending and Commerce Clause authority to legislate "beyond the constitutional minimum." Similarly, while
the court has concluded that neutral and generally applicable
laws cannot violate the Free Exercise Clause, that does not
prevent Congress from protecting religious freedom under the
Spending Clause and Commerce Clause (McConnell 1998,3)

During the battle over the Constitution's ratification, both
Federalists and Anti-Federalists considered the power of the
judiciary. In debating judicial review (the authority to rule on
the constitutionality of laws), the two sides, represented by
"Publius" and "Brutus" respectively, actually found a lot of common ground. Both agreed that the proposed Constitution
allowed the Courts to have the final say in it<; interpretation and
application in reviewing all laws. Indeed, Publius asserts that the
Constitution delineates this power accordingly:The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the
courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the
judges as, a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to
ascertain its meaning as well as the meaning of any particular act
proceeding form the legislative body (Chadwick 1987,423).
They also agreed that the justice's independence and life tenure
during good behavior would effectively strengthen the Court's
power and lead to judicial review. The only argument was
whether or not this would be a good thing. I argue that it is.
Any democratic form of government derives its
authority either directly or indirectly from the people. While

demonstrate the relationship as it is played out in the course
of the policymaking process. Finally, I will demonstrate that
the model fails to fully explain Flores, and seek to offer a
proper explanation as to why this is so.

"With RLPA, Congress has chosen as its "other constitutionally vested
powers "those found in the Spending and the Commerce Clauses to offer a
fuller protection to religious liberty" beyond the constitutional minimum. "
Federalism concerns are also ameliorated in RLPA,
especially due to the Commerce Clause section. Precedent
clearly reserves to Congress (over the States) the right to regulate behavior outside of commercial considerations under the
authority of regulating commerce. To the extent that a particular activity demonstrably affects or touches on "interstate
commerce," it falls within the scope of the Commerce Clause,
and is thus regulable. Since much of the free exercise of religion
will affect and be affected by commerce (such as the Flores situation),RLPA can justifiably exercise that power over any State
prerogative. As McConnell concludes, "[t)he Commerce Clause
is our constitution's means of demarcating the federal from the
state spheres of regulation" (McConnell 1998,5).

3. The Political Game
In this section I am primarily concerned with
exploring the politics of the Smith-RFRA/FIores-RLPA
"game" being played between the various branches of government. I will begin by establishing a general theory of how
the branches (specifically Congress and the Courts) should
work together within the constitutional framework. I will
then introduce a model based on game theory which seeks to
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the Founders favored this idea of popular sovereignty, they
also feared the excess and abuses of such a system-particularly the problem of majority faction. That is, they also sought
to protect minorities who are otherwise left unprotected from
the will of the majority. Therefore, they established a system
which effectively combines "majority rule" with the appropriate structures to protect minority rights. The simplest way
to do that is to constitutionally declare rights, and provide for
a branch of government that can enforce those rights irrespective of the majority. The judiciary fulfills this role, and has
historically provided the means of relief for minorities whose
voices are otherwise stifled by the political process; this at least
assures that their fundamental rights are not also stifled. Thus,
as Rex Lee asserts, "Constitutional rights are, by their nature,
minority rights" (Lee 1993,75)
The difficulty comes in recognizing that the Court
can exercise tremendous control in the realm of policymaking that is otherwise reserved for Congress. This is not to say
that the oversimplified paradigm of a tripartite government,
where the three branches exercise total and complete power
in their sphere, separate form the respective powers of the
others, is correct or even desired. As Richard Neustadt so succinctly stated, the Constitution did not provide a government

of separate powers, "[rJather it created a government of separated institutions sharing power" (qtd. in Nivola and
Rosenbloom 1990,331). However, a respect for democracy
should still dictate to the Court a general "attitude of deference toward the legislature, and a consequent reluctance to
rule against constitutionality" (Lee 1993, 78). Of course, the
Court should pay close attention, because legislative policy
choices, reflecting the will and efforts of the majority, tend to
limit minority rights. When this happens, the Court has the
obligation to intervene and overturn such laws. As we have
already seen, strange constitutional and political questions
arise when just the opposite happens-when Congress
attempts to implement legislation that strengthens (rather
than limits) minority rights.

turned by another player with the authority to do so.
4. Resulting from 1,2, and 3, each player has an "indifference
point" which is the point on the political spectrum that the player likes just as much as another point in the opposite direction
5. The veto median (V) is the point that divides congress with
one-third on one side and two-thirds on the other side of the
spectrum. This is obviously important for the president who is
contemplating a potential veto (Eskridge 1991, 644-5).
Played on a linear field from left (liberal) to right (conservative), the game exists within a political alignment that demonstrates the climate in which it will be played, and which should
dictate the outcome. In the early to mid 1990's, the configuration would resemble.

Figure 1
B. Positive game theory analysis
One way to describe the interplay between the
branches of government is with a game model. Professor
William Eskridge Jr. offers such a model relating to this interaction over civil rights legislation (1991). In it he describes how
certain legislative acts (especially the Civil Rights Act of 1990)
have been implemented by Congress in attempts to overturn
what they see as judicial misinterpretations. This has some readily apparent similarities to the situation we have discussed herein. Indeed, smacking of RFRA both in name and language, the
Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 declared that its purpose,
is to reaffirm pre-Grove City College judicial and executive
branch interpretations and enforcement practices which provided for broad coverage of the anti-discrimination provisions
of these civil rights statutes (qtd. in Eskridge 1991, 636).
Similarly the Civil Rights Act of 1990 declared that, in a series
of recent decisions addressing employment discrimination
claims under Federal Law the Supreme Court cut back dramatically on the scope and effectiveness of civil rights protection. This bill responds to the Supreme Courts recent decisions
by restoring the civil rights protections that were dramatically
limited by those decisions (qtd. in Eskridge 1991,638).
Notice, also, that by narrowly interpreting the statutes, the
Court had effectively limited minority rights that Congress
tried to strengthen, as in the RFRA-Flores situation. As mentioned above, this abandons and reverses the usual paradigm
of Congress limiting, and the Court protecting such rights.
Assuming, then, that we are dealing with similar circumstances (albeit with religious freedom rather that civil rights)
we can try to apply this model.
The players of the game are the Supreme Court
(C), the "legislative gatekeepers" (G), the Congress as a whole
(M), and the President (P). The game begins with the Court's
interpretation of a statute. It then flows in the pattern C JE G
JE M JE P JE M in which each player decides how it will
respond to the previous play within its scope and power
(Eskridge 1991,644). These responses are subject to and constrained by the following considerations and assumptions:
1. The game is played in the sequence outlined above.
2. Each of the players acts on complete information and knowledge thus perfectly anticipating the "future course of play"
3. No player will want to "make a decision that will be over-

Religious Liberty Preferences, 1990-97

This simply means that during this era, the Court
(C) has taken a more conservative stance on its religious freedom preferences than Congress (M) and the President (P),
while the "gatekeepers" (G) are at least slightly more liberal
than Congress as a whole. The indifference point (G (M)) is
equidistant from G, in the opposite direction than M. Thus,
when the game begins, the Court should abandon its policy
preference and compromise on a stand at or just to the left of
M. This is dictated by assumption #3 because,if the Court
implements its own preferences (C) through interpretation ... it will be overridden, because the gatekeepers will have
an incentive to introducing overruling legislation (they prefer
any x < C, and the ultimate result M < C), and Congress will
vote for its preferred outcome over that of the Court (it
prefers M to C) (Eskridge 1991,.650).
Unfortunately, when RFRA came up for review in
Flores this is exactly what did not occur. Rather than deferring
to Congress and abandoning its Smith jurisprudence, the
Court reaffirmed and took a strong stand at C. According to
the model, this should not have happened. This, of course, is
only going to invite a legislative override with complete support of the President, ultimately resulting in a loss for the
Court. Why would the Court do that, and why does the model
not account for it? The inconsistencies may be explicated by
simply altering the model as Eskridge did when he found such
anomalies in his case study. By amending the model with
"informational assumptions," he assumes the game to be even
more dynamic such that policy preferences are formed and
determined during the game in response to the arguments of
the other players (Eskridge 1991,656). This leads to two alternative explanations in our example.
The first is called the "information variation" and
declares that "the Court will stick to its preferences and try to
persuade the gatekeepers and Congress of its views" (Eskridge
1991,658). However, reading Flores one does not exactly feel
like the Court was trying to persuade; it comes across more as
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Game Over
backlash at Congress for challenging its Smith holding. The
second possibility-the "distributive variation"-asserts that
the Court may have tried to shift leftward from its preference
toward M, but "was simply mistaken about the congressional
median" (Eskridge 1991,658). This, too, fails in our example
because with the broad (almost unanimous) and intense congressional support of RFRA, there could clearly be no mistake
in judging M's position. Besides, there is nothing to suggest
that the Court shifted at all; on the contrary, it simply appears
that they thumbed their noses at the legislative branch, openly
inviting further challenges. According to the model (even after
amending), this is a foolish move for the Court, because it will
inevitably lead to a legislative override and thus allow
Congress to win the game. Assuming that the justices possess
good political savvy, we must admit that the model simply fails
to explain this exchange for some reason or another.
The problem lies in the assumption that the SmithRFRA-Flores game is similar to civil rights game used by
Eskridge. While I pointed out some superficial similarities
between the two, there is one significant difference: the model
was designed to deal with various interpretations and preferences of statutory policy, while the Court in Flores raised the
question to the level of constitutional law. Quite simply, feeling challenged by the inflammatory rhetoric of RFRA, the
Court sought to "protect its turf and institutional legitimacy"
(Devins 1998,650). Knowing they could not do so on the normal playing field described by our model, they raised the game
to the higher level of constitutional interpretation. At this level
the Court clearly has the home field advantage and needs only
to invoke its authority to "say what the law is" (Marbury v.
Madison 1803). By upping the stakes in this way, the Court
sends a clear message to Congress:
It is difficult to predict what the outcome ofRLPA
will be. It did not pass in 1998, but it will assuredly be proposed again this session. However, at this point it is uncertain
whether or not it will even be enacted. Mter all, Congress will
be reluctant to risk the time and political capital on a battle
they cannot win-it is no fun playing when you know your
are going to lose. Besides, the lack of substantial harm to religious liberty may not warrant any more challenges at the federallevel. Consequently, the issue may have lost some salience
to politicians who do not perceive it as important to their
constituents. Put simply, Congress just may not be willing to
"take it to the mat" again. If that is true, then what is next? As
I see it, there are three things that could happen.

4. Conclusion
First, RLPA might become law. If this happens, it does
stand at least a fair chance of survival. Since it does not hinge on
the questionable interpretation of the substantive/remedial powers of the Enforcement Clause, the Court should no longer perceive it as a threat to their judicial authority. However, if the
Court is still determined to enforce its position, it might fight the
bill on the issue of federalism in reviewing the Commerce
Clause. Second, the question may simply have to remain at the
state level. Indeed, many states have already adopted their own
RFRA legislation. Third, Congress may seek to pass a

37

Constitutional Amendment. This is, of course, unlikely given the
difficulty and improbability of approving such an amendment let
alone it~ ratification; right now they do not even have enough
interest or support to pass it as a normal legislative act. Regardless
of what happens, it is of great significance that the issue has presented itself for our consideration. Religious liberty is a fundamental right that we are guaranteed under our noble
Constitution, yet if we fail to fully understand and protect that
freedom, we may not recognize when it is taken from us. Worse
yet, we may not care. Especially in the types of cases discussed
herein, when the threat to religious freedom comes from benign,
generally applicable laws, we mll~t recognize that the effects are
no less real or disastrous than if intentional. Thus, we cannot
afford to be apathetic and simply go on living in the anticipation
of peripheral concerns and problems with little concern for religious freedom issues. This is particularly true of our current preoccupation with Y2K and the end of the world. Of course, when
that does occur and the Good Lord comes down to usher it all
in, then as Rex Lee points out, "all laws should be generally
applicable" (Lee 1993,96).
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